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INTRODUCTION 
January 2016 witnessed a milestone event in terms of Iran’s foreign relations with 
China. A milestone on a road of ancient cooperation. The Iranian President, Rouhani greeted 
his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping in Tehran, marking the first visit by a Chinese leader to 
Iran since 2002 (Wuthnow 2). The event was not remarkable because of the visit, as bilateral 
high-level meetings had continued between 2002-2016. This meeting’s importance stemmed 
from the fact that Iran was no longer internationally sanctioned, and China was eager to allow 
its positive relations with Iran to blossom under a new strategic trade partnership. The period 
between 2002-2016 witnessed Iran facing various sanctions, firstly from the U.S, and from 
2006 onward from the UNSC (Harold 66). While the sanctions could have caused 
complications in Iran’s  relations with China, particularly in terms of trade, they managed to 
endure international scrutiny for the most part and continued to engage in economic 
exchanges. These strategic and economic benefits for both nations of interacting with the 
other are often cited as reasons for this continued friendship. Yet, the international scrutiny, 
especially in-terms of U.S-China relations should not be underestimated. China has had to 
carefully balance its interactions with Iran not to offend the U.S, one of its major trade 
partners.  
As fruitful as the material incentives of Iran’s foreign relations with China are, 
extensively focusing on them leaves a gap in explaining Iran’s interactions with China. The 
historical and ideational context of Iran-China relations too are important is understanding 
why China was willing to face international scrutiny and continued to trade with Iran during 
its sanctions; and why Iran saw China as an acceptable partner in the terms of international 
political alignments. Iran (or Persia) has maintained positive foreign relations with China in 
different forms for far longer than the existence of the U.S as a nation, despite their different 
domestic politics. Both countries share a history of ancient trade partnership along the Silk 
Road, and an identity linked to ancient civilizations. Both are also non-Western nations that 
have experienced neo-colonialism in different forms,  revolutions that overthrew their 
monarchies, and the birth of a revolutionary ideology that guided both countries development 
in the form of their modern nation-states.  
These historical factors contribute to both nations current identity perception, and are 
reiterated in high-level meetings today. Particularly the Silk Road is emphasized as a bonding 
factor. Of course, the strategic benefits, such as Iranian oil, Chinese engineering and military 
knowledge, and both nation’s geopolitical power in their respective neighbourhoods are 
important to the strength of Iran-China relations. Especially with regard to China’s economic 
engagement with a sanctioned Iran. This thesis acknowledges the importance that many 
scholars, particularly from the realist and neo-realist school of thought, ascribe to the strategic 
benefits this relationship provides to both nations in the current world order. At the same time 
it attempts to explore the shared Iranian- Chinese identity of being non-Western powers in a 
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world order largely dictated by a Western hegemon. Thus, to contribute to the understanding 
of Iranian-Chinese foreign relations, this thesis attempts to provide an answer to the question: 
how the combination of shared identities and material interest have shaped Iran-China 
relations since 20061? This question will primarily focus on Iranian side of these relations, 
and what factors influence Iran’s interactions with China.  
Theoretical framework: Iran’s foreign relations with China have been discussed by 
numerous scholars2, particularly with regard to China’s investments in Iran during Iran’s 
period of international sanctioning. This thesis follows this line of argument, emphasizing the 
importance of material benefit in Iran-China relations. However, it complements this analysis 
with the exploration of an element that is often neglected: that of identity. Following the 
theoretical adaptations that been suggested by Hinnebusch and Ehteshami, it borrows from 
constructivism to scrutinize the identity factor in Iranian foreign relations with China.     
This thesis is written from a perspective that “emphasises the social, or intersubjective, 
dimensions of world politics”, which translates into a primarily constructivist perspective 
(Griffiths et al 52). Most “[c]onventional approaches to foreign policy analysis” tend to focus 
on the “relative position of a state in the international power hierarchy”, and focus on why 
rather than  how certain decision were made (Doty 298). Studies on Iran’s foreign relations 
with China often fall into this category, with a vast amount of literature being dedicated to 
understanding Iran’s foreign relations with China, and vice versa, from a realist and neo-
realist perspective3, These texts focus on the power balance which is present Iran’s foreign 
relations with China, such as Iran relying on China during Iran’s recent sanction period, and 
China not willing to overstep its relation with the U.S for its friendship with Iran. This thesis 
however shows that the  rationalist perspective on Iran’s foreign relations with China shifts 
once their historically constructed identities are included. This takes into consideration the 
“social order (the environment)” in which both nations are situated (Doty 300).  
Iran and China share ancient foreign relations that continue to this day, and are 
influenced by an identity linked to a struggle for independence and antagonism towards the 
current Western (primarily U.S) hegemon (Wuthnow 1). This perspective allows  the 
intersubjective dimensions of world politics to be included in the analysis of Iran’s foreign 
relations with China. In this regard, this thesis takes a similar approach to Hinnebusch’s 
theory of complex realism, as it “accepts the realist claim that insecurity generates struggles 
for power and that state foreign policy seeks to counter security threats”, yet also accepts 
“constructivism’s insistence that systemic structures are not just material configurations of 
power and wealth and include cultural norms that derive from state identities and lead to a 
unique contestation of state sovereignty” (1-2). In his description of complex realism, 
                                                          
1 2006 is important in terms of Iranian-Chinese relations as it marks the year in which Iran was put under 
international sanctions by UNSC Resolution 1737, as well as the completion of President Ahmadinejad’s first 
year in office.  
2 John W. Garver 2006; Willem van Kemenade 2009; Scott Harold and Alireza Nader2012 
3 such as Van Kemenade’s Iran’s Relations with China and the West: Cooperation and Confrontation in 
Asia ,Harold and Nader’s “China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations”, or Dorraj and English’s 
“China’s Strategy for Energy Acquisition in the Middle East: Potential for Conflict and Cooperation with the 
United States”.  
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Hinnebusch points out that “realists themselves acknowledge, how states respond to 
environmental pressure is a product of internal leadership and policy processes” (3). The 
combination of approaches allows this thesis to address the identity component of Iran’s 
foreign relations with China, and in doing so, complement the analysis which focuses on the 
material incentives of the relationship. 
To support the constructivist perspective on Iran’s foreign relations with China, this 
thesis draws on Dr. Warnaar’s book, Iranian Foreign Policy During Ahmadinejad: Ideology 
and Actions . This book does not treat ideas “as one factor among others, but as the primary 
context in which foreign policy gets shape” (Warnaar 7). Warnaar argues the constructivist 
approach has an advantage when analysing foreign policy as it assists in gaining a deeper 
understanding of the “question of threat perception, the identification of friends and foes, the 
choice of one foreign policy option over other options, as well as the timing of certain foreign 
policy behaviour” (Warnaar 15). The social construction of identity and ideology is vital, as 
this helps explain the continuity in the way it is incorporated in foreign policy (Warnaar 26).  
Adib-Moghaddam follows a similar line of thought in his analysis of Iran’s foreign policy 
culture. Adib Moghaddam describes it as “not only a set of ideas but also a mentality, a Geist, 
a systemic phenomenon that is strong enough to penetrate the strategic thinking of Iran’s 
foreign policy elites to its core”. The foreign policy culture is thus is seen to have “both an 
internal consistency and a highly articulated set of relationship to its agents” (Adib-
Moghaddam 267). In the same vein, the next section, after the methodology, will discuss the 
importance of identity for Iranian foreign policy making. 
Methodology:  
The majority of the research for this thesis was conducted through a qualitative 
approach, gathering a variety of literature on the subject of Iranian-Chinese foreign relations 
and attempting to analyse the identity factor which may be at play. The sources selected for 
this thesis were not limited to the constructivist school of thought, but were analysed through 
a perspective influenced both by constructivism and Hinnebusch’s theory of complex realism, 
as the material gain of Iran’s foreign relations with China is a topic that cannot be ignored 
(Hinnebush 1-2; Griffiths et al 52).  
During the period of researching and writing this thesis, the news on Iran and China 
was followed carefully by reading a variety of news sources including Xinhaunet, Al Waght, 
The New York Times and Al Jazeera. A problem encountered while conducting the research 
was a lack of knowledge of both Farsi and Mandarin, therefore, all news sources and literature 
studied may have had some bias and not be truly representative of a variety of perspectives on 
Iranian-Chinese foreign relations.  Fortunately, it was possible to find literature in English 
written by Iranian and Chinese authors, as well as other international authors who have spent 
time in Iran. Twitter and interviews were also used as sources to be able to interact with 
another perspective. The research first engaged with understanding the ancient history of 
Iranian foreign relations with China, as well and delving into the trade component of this 
relationship. Finally, Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Iran and the new strategic trade partnership 
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was analysed in more detail to gain a current understanding of Iran’s foreign relations with 
China.  
 
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO IRAN’S POST-REVOLUTIONARY FOREIGN 
POLICY 
The most prominent foreign policy agents in Iran are the complex power-system that 
exists in Iranian politics. The president in Iran is in continuous “negotiation” and competition” 
with the many other powerful institutions. According to the “1979 Constitution”, Iran’s main 
foreign policy decision making body is the Supreme Council for National Security which is 
composed of the speaker of parliament (legislative branch), and the president(judiciary and 
executive branch), and the “chief of the Supreme Command Council of the Armed Forces, the 
officer in charge of the planning and budget affairs, two representatives nominated by the 
leader, ministers of foreign affairs, interior, and information, a minister related with the 
subject, and highest ranking official from the Armed Forces and the Islamic Revolution’s 
Guards Corps.’” Furthermore, the supreme leader has the “final word in foreign policy issues”  
(Warnaar 3).  This complex system limits the power of the president in his/her individual 
power to shape foreign policy, however, platforms such as international visits and speeches at 
international organisations allow the president to influence Iranian foreign policy (Warnaar 4). 
One of the consistencies in the post-revolutionary foreign policy of Iran is a 
“motivational drive towards challenging international realities” (Adib-Moghaddam 267), 
continuing to challenge the status-quo. Warnaar draws on Karin Fierke’s argument that Iran’s 
foreign policy is “feeding back into the discourse of change by ‘acting as if’ international 
change is happening.” This act allows Iran to be involved in the international power balance, 
and thus challenge it. Iran attempts to find sympathizers from other “developing and rising 
powers”. “Iran actively tr[ies] to shape the world in line with its own discourse: in particular, 
the decline of US power and challenging the notion that Iran in isolated”  (Warnaar 3).  
 This discourse finds sympathy in the Chinese outlook of international-relations, and is 
in line with China’s perception of its peaceful rise to become a hegemonic power. Harold and 
Nader draw on a Chinese analyst to support this point stating that “Sino-Iranian relations can 
begin to tilt ever more in a strategic direction, seeking to raise [Chinese] political influence 
and efficacy in international affairs through the strengthening of [Chinese] relations with Iran” 
(19). The material incentives for both nations are an additional factor that assist in 
strengthening their ties, as Iran sees in China a trading partner that is “neither East nor West”4, 
and has greatly supported its missile advancement, and most recently its push for urban 
modernisations.  
The post-revolutionary identity of Iran should not be left out when discussing its 
foreign-policy with China, as this identity is what assists in understanding the anti-hegemonic 
                                                          
4 “During the 1980’s, Iran’s foreign policy was redefined under the slogan ‘neither East nor West’ in defiance of 
both the Soviet Union and the United States. This policy dovertailed nicely with the Chinese government’s 
global political agenda”(Dorraj and Currier 69).  
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motivation of the nation in international relations. Maloney understands Iranian national 
identity to include various different identities, basing her argument on the idea that identity is 
“chosen, rather than innate” (89). Connecting to the previous point about Iran’s  anti-
hegemonic motivations in foreign policy, Maloney argues that a component of Iranian 
national identity aside from Persian nationalism and Islam is the “enduring sense of rejection 
of the other, which manifests itself both in the pursuit of ‘true’ sovereignty and authenticity as 
well as a passionate rejection  of foreign influence” (Maloney 89). This characteristic can be 
linked to Iran’s ancient history in its current geographical boundaries, as well as the British 
colonial role in Iran, and the more recent American hegemon, which has kept “anti-imperialist 
nationalism alive long after de-colonization” (Hinnebusch 3).    
THE SHARED HISTORICAL IDENTITIES OF IRAN AND CHINA 
Iran and China do not simply share an identity of post-colonial suspicion towards 
Western powers, they both share ancient historical ties that date back to the days of great 
empires. The following section will discuss the similarities between Iranian and Chinese 
identities through analysing their ancient historical ties. These comparisons attempt to 
illustrate why the historical identity is an important factor in Iranian-Chinese foreign relations 
and should not be dismissed in favour of explanations that focus purely on the material 
incentives of the relationship, and their position in the current word order.   
Ancient Civilisations: Iran and China both share a common identity of being the 
home of ancient, and in many ways continuous civilisation, which is reiterated in their foreign 
policy. Both countries are “civilisations with deep historical roots, rich cultural traditions and 
illustrious imperial pasts”. The authors believe that these reasons contribute to creating a basis 
for both nations to share “psychological identifications” (Dorraj&Currier 66). China and 
Iran’s ancient friendship is often played upon during “high-profile or important Sino-Iranian 
interactions” (Garver 9). This rhetoric has taken various forms, such as Chinese Premier Zhou 
Enlai, during Princess Ashraf’s visit in April 1971, stressing the “ancient ties between the two 
countries… ‘long standing historical contacts and traditional friendships have existed between 
China and Iran… ‘dating back more than two thousand years’” (Garver 9).  This rhetoric 
continued in post- revolution Iran-China relations, such as during Rafsanjani’s visit to China 
in 19855, he agreed with Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang that both nations were “Third World 
countries with similar histories”.  “The history of contacts between Iran and China” were 
again mentioned by Xi Jinping, the current Chinese President, in January 2016 on his state 
visit to Iran. Xi Jinping referred to the Silk Road as “the symbol of ‘peace, progress and 
friendly exchanges’ (AlWaght). This identification by both countries of themselves and of the 
other as ancient civilisations with a “common pride in ancient accomplishments” (Garver 11) 
is a good basis for enduring friendship. 
Subjugation to Western Powers: A factor that adds to Iran’s ancient friendship with 
China is the shared “humiliating experience of neo-colonialism”(Dorraj&Curreir 67) . Neither 
Iran nor China were directly ruled by European powers during the age of colonialism (15th 
Century onwards), however, European powers did exercise “extraordinary influence” on both 
                                                          
5 Rasfanjani was not President at that point, he was visiting China as a top-level Islamic Republic of Iran  
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nations (Garver 11). Initially, the expanding European Powers were not able to “impose their 
will on such powerful states as the Safavid empire of Persia (1502-1722) or the Ming and 
Qing empires of China (1368-1644 and 1644-1911, respectively)” (Garver 8). However, the 
1800’s brought an infiltration by Western Powers to the social, economic, and political 
spheres of both Iran and China (Garver 8).  
The Resurrection of Power: This oppression by Western powers and their shared 
ancient history fuel another similarity between the two countries, i.e. revolutions. “This deep 
sense of historical identity and national pride may partially explain why Iran and China have 
experienced several revolution in the twentieth century in which the themes of anti-
imperialism and nationalist self-assertion played a prominent ideological role” ( Dorraj and 
Currier 67). Both Iran and China share an identity as empires that existed prior to Western6 
colonist pursuits. Furthermore, both nations encountered “[p]rofound, ultra-radical revolutions 
[that] ended the[ir] imperial monarchies”7 (Van Kemenade 10). These revolutions were “led 
and personified by messianic great leaders”, Ayatollah Khomeini and Chairman Mao, “who 
both destroyed the ‘ancien regimes’ by violent means and created new societies with a new 
type of moral order” (Van Kemenade 10). The revolutions were both extremely different in 
their preaching. The Iranian presented a “hybrid reactionary Islamist fundamentalism, mixed 
with republican and democratic element”, whilst the Chinese was “based on extreme leftist, 
atheist, egalitarianism” (Van Kemenade 10).  The similarities lie in the causes of both 
revolutions to some extent, as each occurred in response to an “increasingly dictatorial, 
repressive and out-of-touch…monarchy” (Van Kemenade 11). A further factor that links the 
two nations’ post-revolutionary identity was their need to export their revolutions in some 
form to gain domestic legitimacy. For Iran this export occurred in the form of “armed 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries”, such as Lebanon and Bahrain. For 
China, this took the form of “Mao’s obsessive export of the revolution” to neighbouring 
countries such as Indonesia and Burma (Van Kemenade 11-12).  
These revolutions were decisive as they were rallying against the western hegemon 
and thus the international regime. According to the “hegemonic stability theory (Hinnebusch 
2006), one way to overcome the inability of states under anarchy to co-operate, even where 
they might all benefit, is for a hegemon to  impose an ‘international regime’- a set of rules and 
consultation practices” (Hinnebusch 19).  Iran and China, however, did not abide by “set of 
rules and consultation practices”. The dialogue of mutual friendship based on a shared ancient 
history and “resentment of treatment by the West” fuels a “determination by both Iran and 
China to restore their well-deserved high international status” (Garver 11). Both countries 
share a feeling that “the current international order [is] dominated by the west…does not 
accord them” their desired high-international status (Garver 11).  
This apprehension towards the West is shared by Iran and China, and strengthened by 
factors such as the Western view of “arms control” as a means of safeguarding peace and 
stability, and “to prevent newly emerging powers from the Third World from challenging the 
                                                          
6 Primarily European, however, in the case of China, Japan was also a coloniser 
7 Referring to the Chinese revolution of 1911, and the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 
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status quo.” For Iran and China, this paradigm is seen as “instruments used by established 
powers to maintain their dominance and superiority” (Van Kemenade 57).This point assists in 
explaining why Iran and China have a recent history of arms trade and exchange of military 
information. Warnaar’s book points out that the Iranian regime was using the nuclear issues to 
challenge the US and “create[e] global space for itself among developing and rising powers, 
while defending what is considered a cause for the entire developing world”(136). This 
reading of the nuclear issue makes it fall very much in line with China’s desire for multi-polar 
world order. This perspective makes it seem that both countries find in the other an ally in 
their pursuit of a different world order.  
Recognition of Power: Iran and China see each other as allies in this attempt to move 
away from the Western domination of the current world order, since they both recognize that 
“each possesses… capabilities superior to those of most of the other states in their respective 
regions” (Garver 17). The rhetoric used by China to describe Iran over the years has included 
Iran being called a country of “strategic importance” by President Li Xiannian, as well as 
“China’s paramount leader Hu Jintao” calling Iran a “developing regional power” and 
“attached great significance to cooperation with it” in April 2004 (Garver 18). For China, 
Iran’s position with access to the Persian Gulf and “offering convenient overland transit 
between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean” (Garver 18), make it an appealing ally and add to 
its geo-political power.  Apart from the physical location of the respective countries, Iran and 
China see in each other the capability to contain “aggressive US actions” (Garver 20). Iran 
and China “have a common strategic interest in forming a counterweight to American 
hegemony in the region”,  along with a “shared interest in economic relations”,  and shared 
historical identities that help forge positive foreign relations (Bliler; Harold 70). 
THE TRADE BENEFITS OF IRAN’S POSITIVE FOREIGN RELATIONS 
TOWARDS CHINA: A RECENT HISTORY  
The post-revolution history of Iranian-Chinese foreign relations primarily involves 
various economic exchanges, including arms sales and oil. These factors may put the identity 
component on the back-burner, but Iran’s consistency in its dealings with China, despite 
China facing great pressure from the U.S illustrates that both are valuable trade partners to 
another, a material incentive in their relations, yet it also indicates that the identity component 
should not be dismissed. The identity factor assists in understanding the trade partnership.  
Rekindling the Friendship: Before focusing on the economic incentives of the 
Iranian-Chinese relationship and their positions as counterweights to American hegemony, a 
recent brief pause in their friendly exchanges must be noted. Whilst anti-Shah sentiments 
were gaining momentum in Iran during the 70’s, the Chinese regime supported the Shah 
against the Iranian people; expressing “some surprise that the Shah did not use more 
draconian military means to put down the uprisings”. It took a “top-level apology from 
Chairman Hua Guofeng8 to Ayatollah Khomeini” and years of “obsequious diplomacy” to 
rekindle the friendship (Van Kemenade 42). This point illustrates that the Iranian regime may 
                                                          
8 Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China from 1976-1981: 
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Hua-Guofeng  
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see benefits in engagement with China, yet it does adhere to its own ideology and the Chinese 
too put in effort with their relationship with Iran. This same period saw “[p]ost-Mao China” 
was entering into a “quasi-alliance” with the “satanic”  U.S, which too continues to this day 
(Van Kemenade 42). Repeatedly, such as during the Clinton era, the U.S. attempted to 
“isolate and weaken Iran and it demanded China’s cooperation in this effort,” but China has 
not always seen eye-to-eye with the U.S. Foreign Policy, and is independent in its agenda as 
well. China’s lack of compliance with these demands and can be linked to “China’s interest to 
thwart [America’s] drive towards world domination.” China sees Iran as “strong ally in this 
endeavour, not only for tis energy supply but for stability in one of the strategically most 
important, but also most volatile regions of the world” (Van Kemenade 51 Confrontation in 
Asia). None the less, the U.S is a factor of discontent that continuously creeps up in the 
context of Iranian-Chinese foreign relations, especially in relation to the U.S attempting to 
curtail their economic exchanges.  
Arms deals and U.S pressure on China: 1972 saw a normalisation of Chinese-U.S 
relations, this was marked by U.S President Nixon’s visit to China and meeting with 
Chairman Mao. This was a big step in the international political arena, as both countries had 
had frigid relations since the 1940s in relation to America’s support for the government of the 
Republic of China, Taiwan (U.S Department of State). This normalisation of Chinese-U.S 
relations has not translated to continuous peace and corporation between these two states. Iran 
has been an issue of contention in their relationship, beginning with China’s recognition and 
apology to the Iranian revolutionary government for the Chinese support of the Shah. 
Following this, another issue of contention arose through the Iran-Iraq war. Originally, China 
had maintained a neutral stance, stressing that “Iran and Iraq were both Muslim countries 
belonging to the Third World. ‘Hence, there is no conflict of fundamental interest between 
them’”(Renmin ribao quoted by Garver 70). However, the Chinese interest in their own 
position in the Middle East and desire to prevent the U.S from gaining greater control of the 
Persian Gulf, led them to supply arms to Iran (Garver 72). In 1982, allegedly 40% of Iran’s 
arms were supplied  by China and North Korea, and by 1987 “the number had risen to 70[%]” 
(Garver 72). A shift in this percentage was contributed by Iran’s purchase of Chinese Silk 
Worm missiles, as China regarded the U.S being inconsistent in their Iran policy. This feeling 
emerged from the “Iran-Contra Scandal” which alleged that the Reagan administration had 
sold arms to Iran (Van Kemenade 44).  
Iran’s  targeting the American military in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war made 
China weary, as it was aware that this would have repercussions with regard to its relationship 
with the U.S. None the less, in “March 1988” Iran “ignored Chinese warnings to avoid direct 
confrontation with the U.S…[which resulted in] China agree[ing]-under US pressure to end 
Silkworm sales to Iran” (Van Kemenade 44). The 1990’s saw another surge in the arms trade 
between Iran and China, with China agreeing to sell “150 C-802s to Iran” along with “launch 
platforms for anti-ship missiles, rapid-attack craft, rocket-propelled risings mines and 
helicopters”. Yet, again the U.S was involved in this trade-deal, pressurising China to freeze 
the deal after only half the C-802s missiles were delivered (Van Kemenade 47-48).  Apart 
from Iran having a history of buying missiles from China, China is also noted for its “crucial 
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role in starting up Iran’s indigenous military-industrial sector” (Harold and Nader 7). Oghab, 
Nazeat, and Shahb 3 are all examples of missiles that are illustrative of China’s engineering 
and design influence on the Iranian military sector (Harold and Nader 7). A link in the transfer 
of military engineering information between China and Iran is suspected to be North Korea 
(Harold and Nader 7), one of Iran’s fellow members of an axis of evil9.  
The 2000s saw a surge in arms trade between Iran and China again, as both believed 
“Iran faced an increasing threat from the United States”. “ China assisted [Iran’s] efforts to 
improve its military capabilities”, apparently supplying US$664 million “worth of arms to 
Iran during 2002-2009” according to Arms Transfer Database of the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). “Iran was the second ranking recipient of Chinese 
munitions during the 2005-2009 period, behind only Pakistan” (Garver CIP).  Both nation’s 
shared “scepticism of the US-dominated world order and their absence of territorial disputes” 
are perhaps reasons that this arms trade has continued, and their relations remain warm 
(Harold 70).   
The 2000s were also a period of heightened attention being given to Iran’s nuclear 
programme that too has been influenced by China. “From 1985 to 1996, China provided Iran 
with various types of critical nuclear technology and machinery…In particular, Chinese 
technician and engineers played an important role in training Iranian nuclear engineers in 
establishing the Esfahan Nuclear Research Center” (Harold and Nader 8). The U.S has also 
pressurised China in this domain, being the reason why China “stopped direct nuclear support 
to Iran in 1997”. China’s placement of its relationship with the U.S over that of Iran was not 
welcomed in Tehran (Harold and Nader 8). However, this was not the end of Iranian military 
dealings with China. Iran’s dependency on Chinese design and engineering skills to develop 
its military have made it reliant on China to some degree (Harold and Nader 1).  Additionally, 
China has pushed for accepting Iran’s claim that its nuclear programme was for peaceful use, 
to which Iran has a right being a signatory of the NPT (Garver 163; Van Kemenade 103 China 
Vs. ).  
Sanctions: Iran’s nuclear programme and the secrecy around it, have consequentially 
led it to being subjected to a number of sanctions. China, having experienced being 
sanctioned by the U.S first-hand (Garver 207; Harold 66; 70), has never been extremely 
supportive of implementing them on other nations. “China opposes sanctions in principle 
(Van Kemenade 100 Iran Sanctions). Bearing this in mind, it is no surprise that  China began 
to side with Iran in terms of condemning “the U.S response of levying economic sanctions 
against [Iran]” in response to the hostage crisis, in April 1980 (Garver 66). Iran’s recent 
history of sanctions involves four UN Security Council “resolutions, (1737 in 2006, 1747 in 
2007, 1803 in 2008, and 1929 in 2010)”, dealing with the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme. 
China’s hesitance on voting on these sanctions is no secret, it applied a “‘delay-and-weaken’ 
strategy” according to the International Crisis Group (Garver 6 CIP; Harold 66). Despite 
China’s ‘delay-and-weaken strategy’, it ultimately did succumb to international pressure and 
                                                          
9 In January 2002, U.S president, George W. Bush designated Iran a member of “an axis of evil”. The Chinese 
government spoke out against this point in favor of Iran’s  “call for a  ‘dialogue among civilizations’” (Garver 
284). 
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voted in approval of all four UNSC resolutions on separate occasions. For the U.S, “China’s 
cooperation” is perhaps the “most critical element” to halter Iran’s nuclear weapons 
development (Harold and Nader 1). Yet Iran’s “broad and deep partnership” with China, 
partially including Beijing’s ability to use Iran as a “point of leverage against the United 
States”, has made it hesitant to comply with the U.S (Harold and Nader 1). Throughout the 
sanctions, China assisted the Iranian economy by “using a barter system to trade Iranian oil 
for its goods and services” (Harold and Nader 12). Iranian and Chinese interests “overlap 
substantially on issues of international order, technology transfer, and trade, especially with 
regard to energy” (Harold 62). Iran managed to export about 50% of its crude oil to China 
during the sanctions, which greatly assisted the Iranian economy during the sanction period 
(Harold 66). The shared perspective on the Western hegemony of international relations thus 
became the backdrop for this bilateral trade.  
Economic cooperation: China’s assistance to Iran throughout its sanctioned period is 
illustrative of this continuous partnership. “Sino-Iranian economic cooperation began to 
expand in 1982.” In December 1982, “[a]n agreement was signed providing for an increase of 
total bilateral trade from $200 million in 1982 to $500 million in 1983. With war, sanctions, 
and Iran’s revolutionary activism isolating it from traditional trading partners, Tehran need 
new partners. Again China seized the opportunity” (Garver 72). In 2012, a “PRC analyst 
noted, ‘more than one hundred Chinese firms have invested in Iran, and they have signed 
contracts with Iranian oil and gas ministries worth more than US$12 billion’, for which reason 
‘the challenge China is facing is this: if it participates in the sanctions…it was cause a very 
substantial impact on its interests in Iran” (Harold 65). The economic benefits of cooperating 
with an Iran that was isolated by the international community outweighed the risks, China 
used the time after each UN resolution to accelerate and expand its economic ties with Tehran 
(Harold and Nader 9). A point which was welcomed by Iran, as illustrated by the Iranian Oil 
Minister’s comment on China: “Those who were our friend during sanctions will receive our 
friendship to the same proportion” (Oil Minister Zanageh quoted by Glenn and Park). Iran is 
vital to China’s goal of “sustainable economic development” as it is has the energy resources 
to support this (Glenn and Park). The general trade pattern between Iran and China has “come 
to be characterized” by China importing oil from Iran and in return exporting manufactured 
goods to Iran (Harold 63).  This made China an ideal partner for an Iran that felt the toll of the 
sanctions, as its access to “foreign capital and expertise” required to “develop its declining 
energy sector” had been curtailed. China was “a strong economic partner and a crucial 
provider of the investment and technology necessary for Iran’s economic development and 
modernization” (Harold and Nader 5) 10.  These points clearly identify the material incentives 
of this bilateral trade, that too need to be considered when analysing Iranian-Chinese foreign 
relations, as they have become a vital component of it.  
 
  The Iranian-Chinese trade relationship in recent history is interesting to analyse from a 
constructivist perspective, as it does not always adhere to the realist expectations of China 
                                                          
10 An example of Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure is the Tehran Metro Project (Harold and Nader 11; 
Van Kemenade 119 Iran’s Relations) and  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-iran-finance-
idUSBRE89E0PT20121015  
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prioritising its relationship with the U.S, the current hegemon, over that with Iran.  However, 
the realist argument to counter this would be to state that China treats Iran as a “fair-weather” 
friend rather than an “all-weather” friend, a point supported by the lack of high-profile visits 
from Chinese heads of state to Iran during the sanction periods from 2002-2016 (Wuthnow 2). 
Yet, official state visits aside, the consistent economic exchanges between the two nations 
indicate overall positive relations, with their historical identities used to support these 
continuous actions. Perhaps China simply “possess a series of competing international 
identities that try to satisfy a variety of international (and domestic) constituencies” 
(Shambaugh  and Xiao 37). Iran and the U.S form separate constituencies, with the identity 
factor and trade relations composing separate constituencies again,  but actions in favour of 
one do not necessarily result in a falling out with the other.  
IRAN’S FOREING POLICY TOWARDS CHINA: 2006 onwards   
Iran’s quasi reliance on China for economic support during its sanctioned period 
should not be taken as the only reason  for the existence of this relationship. This section will 
discuss the identity politics at play in Iran from 2006 to the present, and how this affected its 
foreign relations towards China, analysing how the historically shared identities that incited 
positive foreign relations among the two countries endured a period of international 
sanctioning, as well as the election of the conservative President Ahmadinejad and his 
moderate successor Rouhani . 
Uniting against the hegemon- Ahmadinejad 2006 and the ‘third world’: 
Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, with the “fall of the Taliban and Saddam regimes” 
which were opening up the geopolitical neighborhood to a new and malleable future (Warnaar 
xiii). Keeping in mind the constructivist approach to international relations, that does not 
automatically assume “strategic rivalry” to be an innate condition in the “interaction between 
states”, however that this rivalry is based on previous interactions and “mutual perception of 
the other” (Warnaar 67). Therefore, the apparent friction between Iran and principally the U.S 
can be understood to be a historically based one, rather than a challenge to the status quo. 
Iran’s identity being based on fierce independence creates a paranoia of external interference 
in its domestic policies (Warnaar 67). Paranoia, the sense of being threatened, is a great tool 
to gain popular support, it creates a sentiment of us vs. the other, the unknown, the enemy. 
Iran’s past interactions with Western powers during the colonial period left a bitter-aftertaste 
which is emphasized in the revolutionary Iranian rhetoric. A factor that gains empathy from 
China. Ahmadinejad repeated this rhetoric of an arrogant and ignorant west that was harming 
its own people and the world in general (Warnaar 83). The portrayal of the harmful other, 
reinforces the benefits of being part of the Iranian state. The Western interference in 
Afghanistan and Iraq provide excellent examples for Ahmadinejad to justify this mind-set. An 
important stance Ahmadinejad took, in line with the Supreme Leader Khamenei, was to focus 
on morality over Islam as the guiding path to over-come this Western hegemony (Warnaar 
87). The ‘us’ incorporated fellow victims of colonialism, and thus allowed Ahmadinejad to 
stay on positive terms with “developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa” 
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(Warnaar 87). Ahmadinejad, as Khamenei recently has too11, emphasized that “Asian are 
more sincere than Westerners”(Warnaar 87).  A factor that tends to immediately favour China 
over Western countries with regard to Iran’s foreign relations, including of course the aspect 
of trade.  
The definition of who are included in the us and who belong to the other are seen as 
liquid as well, “[c]hange is imminent, and states, including the arrogant powers, have the 
agency to change themselves” (Warnaar 89). Therefore, despite China’s overt friendliness 
towards the U.S at some points more than others, it too is ever changing and therefore can be 
forgiven. The concept of development, and thus positive change, was emphasized by 
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei (Warnaar 92). This development is directed towards coming 
closer to God, but also towards an even more “independent, resistant, and popular country” 
(Warnaar 92). This rhetoric is also in line with China’s peaceful rise, which is based on the 
historic greatness of China, but can also be said to foster change is positive direction (in terms 
of international power) for China (Harold and Nader 19). 
A further outlook in which Iran and China hold similar views, that was re-emphasized 
during Ahmadinejad’s regime, is the human rights factor. Human rights are not regarded as 
universal by both regimes, but rather as an attempt of the Western-hegemony to manipulate 
their domestic policies. Both countries have been accused on various occasions of human 
rights abuses, such as China’s Tiananmen Square massacre in 1988. Contrary to the Western 
world’s shock , “[t]he Islamic Republic… supported the Chinese government’s crackdown on 
the…democracy movement as a legitimate initiative to restore law and order” (Dorraj and 
Currier 69). The Chinese government has official stated that it believes the West’s ‘attempt to 
address the human rights situation in China” is a “tool for foreign meddling” (Warnaar 76).  
In line with these thoughts, China does not  criticize Iran for its apparent human rights abuses, 
such as those apparently committed during the 2009 protests. There is even speculation that 
China may have even provided active assistance in monitoring and suppressing Iranian 
opposition forces (through the provision of telecommunications tracking technology and 
crowd control devices)” (Harold and Nader 5-6). 
Additional to their shared mistrust of the West, high-oil prices helped solidify positive 
relations between Iran and China. High-oil prices may have been a blessing in disguise for 
Iran under Ahmadinejad’s presidency. It allowed the “Ahmadinejad administration” to engage 
in “‘check-book diplomacy’” as developing countries required “assistance” (Warnaar 128). 
Ahmadinejad used “international organizations such as the D8, NAM and OIC” to criticise 
the Western hegemony (Warnaar 128). A point to note in reference to China is that from the 
above mentioned organisations, the only one it is a member of is NAM, and China has an 
observer status there. Under Ahmadinejad, China “had become Iran’s largest trading partner 
with 18.5[%] of exports and 13.3[%] of imports”, this data excludes “China arms exports to 
Iran” (Van Kemenade 105-106 Iran’s Relations). China was the big winner in terms of Iranian 
                                                          
11 Ayatollah Khamenei, on the occasion of Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Tehran had said that “Iran seeks 
cooperation with more Independent countries” because “Iranians never trusted the West” 
(http://www.rferl.org/content/china-president-iran-visit/27506325.html) 
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oil-deals in 2009, whilst United Nations sanctions had curtailed foreign investment in Iran, 
China seemed to bypass12 them and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) 
signed a $4.7 billion contract with the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) in “Beijing to 
develop phase 11 of the South Pars gas field” (Van Kemenade 117 Iran’s Relations). 
China during the Ahmadinejad Administration: China did not have a “prominent 
position in the discourse either in a positive or negative sense” (Warnaar 131). Warnaar shares 
an Iranian official’s stand-point on China, which states that “China is a country which has no 
negative history against [Iran’s] national interest. Also, no colonial past has been observed 
and it has usually carried out its commitments to Iran. Therefore, the expansion of ties with 
China is in Iran’s interest” (132). China’s position on the UN Security Council, booming 
economy, and lack of regard of human rights issues (Harold and Nader 23; Warnaar 132) 
make it an appealing partner for Iran, in the past and present. “Ahmadinejad tried to promote 
[Iran’s] Asian identity and encourage inter-Asian cooperation” (Warnaar 132). It is important 
to mention the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation at this point, as Iran was granted observer 
status in 2005 (Akbarzadeh 92; Warnaar 132), a “position that was denied to the U.S the same 
year” (Warnaar 132). However, until today, Iran has not achieved a position of permanent 
membership in the SCO. Iran’s nuclear programme under Ahmadinejad and the international 
sanctions placed on it are cited as the reasons for the SCO’s rejection of Iran’s application for 
permanent membership (Akbarzadeh 92;Warnaar 133). 
China’s balancing act with Ahmadinejad: The economic proponent in Iran’s 
relationship with China cannot be ignored, an argument often sighted by realists, such as 
Harold and Nader, and Wuthnow, to explain this budding partnership in the Eastern 
hemisphere. The deeper identity and ideological similarities that support Iran’s friendly 
foreign policy towards its Eastern neighbor have been mentioned previously, yet China’s 
diverse and large investments have of course helped these friendly sentiments grow, this is 
where the theory of complex realism assists in understanding Iran’s foreign relations with 
China. “China became one of the main investors in Iran’s energy sector” in 2004; one of the 
high-points being Sinopec’s 100 billion dollar investment in 2007 (Warnaar 133). The lack of 
competition in Iran from Western economic powers due to the sanctions made it an appealing 
and rewarding investment for China. “However, as sanctions tightened, these relations 
became more difficult to maintain” (Warnaar 133). The U.S pressure on China began to 
mount, and once again, China did not want to jeopardize its U.S relations for Iran (Warnaar 
148). However, Garver argues that “Iranian leaders probably understand China’s” choices 
well. “They do not like Bejing’s prioritising of [Chinese-US] relations over [Iranian-Chinese] 
relations. But they understand China’s” choice, and see China as their greatest support system 
against “US threat and pressure” (76 CIR). China’s room for manoeuvring between US and 
Iran is their foreign relations, never excluding either one is illustrative that identities are 
“adopted and not intrinsic”, better foreign relations with one country do not come inherently, 
                                                          
12 As China is not an OECD  member, “its banks are able to operate outside the normal export credit rules” 
(Moss & Rose, 2006 in Dorraj &English 179). Additionally, “China does not adhere to transparency initiatives 
such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Therefore, the money its NOCs and banks” pay to “oil-
producing countries is not always reported publicly” (Dorraj & English 179). 
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nor are static. Countries and national identities are “defined as much by whom and what we 
reject as different, as by references that resonate” (Maloney 93). 
Strong points of Ahmadinejad’s regime: Under Ahmadinejad, Iran asserted its 
revolutionary identity as an “independent and developing” nation (Warnaar 135).  It stood 
strong against mounting pressure under the sanctions in response to its nuclear programme, 
and was “able to assert its moral superiority by resisting United States demands” (Warnaar 
135). The strength in Iran’s resistance perhaps arose from placing Western pressure in its 
revolutionary discourse, which made “giving into Western demands…irrational; rationality 
[was] to build alliances that secure[d] Iran’s independence and development, building a future 
in which the United States no longer makes rules” (Warnaar136-137). This point again is in 
line with China’s attempts to shift the status quo away from the American hegemon to a 
multipolar hegemon. Nourafchan interprets this behaviour through a reformist perspective, 
indicating that “China is gradually increasing its relative capabilities while desensitizing [the 
US] to its rise in order to establish a multipolar system in which China would be one among 
several great powers”. Nourafchan calls this phenomenon “opportunistic pragmatism” (29). 
Despite the lack of attention given to identity by Nourafchan, this behaviour in China’s 
foreign policy links closely to Iran’s attempt to challenge US power by acting as if this were 
already the case, and thus carving out its own independent position in international relations 
(Warnaar 3). 
The Nuclear Programme under Ahmadinejad: Despite the harsh criticism Iran 
received for its nuclear programme from the status quo, as well as China’s choice to 
intermittently distance itself from the Ahmadinejad due to sanctions, “the nuclear issue made 
it possible for [Iran] to act within an international space in which United States’ power is 
challenged by rising powers, increasing Iran’s international options and challenging the 
notion that it [was] isolated” (Warnaar 137).. A point of irony with regard to the U.S fear of 
Iran’s nuclear programme is that its developments were facilitated by the U.S during the 
Shah’s reign in the 1950s (Warnaar 138). Iran is a signatory of the NPT, and thus has the right 
to develop its nuclear programme for peaceful purposes. This point has been stressed by 
China repeatedly as an answer for its hesitance to implement and support sanctions on Iran 
(Van Kemenade 103 China Western). Iran states that it is in need of nuclear energy, which 
may seem ironic due to its large oil and gas reserves, however, as consequence of continuous 
sanctions, it claims that it has not been to develop its extraction technology and therefore 
needs a new energy source to rely on. Stern’s research supports this claim (Dorraj & Currier 
76; Warnaar 141). It is thus in Iran’s national interest to pursue nuclear energy. This point has 
been accepted by China in the past, and used again to support its hesitance to implement 
sanctions. It too shares Iran’s weariness of the U.S hegemony in this subject matter (Warnaar 
147). Iran portrayed the Western fear of its nuclear development project in terms of the 
West’s desire to maintain its domination in the realm of scientific development (Warnaar 145). 
This successfully, portrays the West as the other who does not trust or support the 
development of the ‘us’. Thus, Iran managed to portray itself as a champion of the developing 
world, and the oppressed, resisting Western pressure and pursuing its independence.  
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China’s Preference for a Status-quo Iranian President: China’s support for Iran 
throughout its sanction period is indicative of its peaceful rise, and willingness to challenge 
the US hegemony of international politics, however, as the example of Iran’s rejection of 
permanent membership at the SCO is illustrative, China is conscious of the repercussion of 
being overtly friendly towards an internationally sanctioned Iran (Akbarzadeh 92; Warnaar 
133). As early as 2008, Dorraj& Currier indicated Iranian-Chinese relations were following a 
positive course, however, if Iran were to “assume a more belligerent foreign-policy posture, 
substantially escalating tensions with the United States and its European allies,” China would 
“decide to distance itself from” Iran (79). China used the US attempt to “rally the global 
community against countries such as Iran” to “access their energy resources and to 
counterbalance US influence” to facilitate the “emergence of a multipolar world” (Dorraj 
&English 174).  Yet, China having economically established itself in Iran during the sanction 
period may see the benefits of a having a more neutral Iran in the international arena of world 
politics. Rouhani’s election was welcomed by China, and his “centrist-pragmatic agenda” has 
assisted in opening Iran to international investment and neutralising its relations with the US. 
President Rouhani’s first interview with CNN in 2013 echoed this shift in Iranian foreign 
policy, where he stated that the it is important for the President of Iran to act according to 
what is best for the nation’s people, and mentioned that the Supreme leader had said that if 
necessary, Iranian ministers should be willing to hold talk with their American counter-parts 
to ease tensions (Around minute 5“Raw: Hassan Rouhani Full Interview with Amanpour”). 
This shift put Iran back in a more neutral position in international world politics. A more 
neutral Iran allows China to increase its investments in the country without having to fear US 
scrutiny, and being able to be more open about its investments (Wuthnow 2). 
Rouhani and Xi Jinping: The Iranian identity at play in its foreign policy towards 
China is not limited to a strong anti-western ideology, it includes to some extent the people of 
the country and their quotidian situation, which includes their finances. A factor which led to 
Ahmadinejad being seen as an unpopular president towards the end of  his presidency, based 
principally on his “reckless rhetoric and policies, particularly as it affected people’s 
pocketbooks…For that reason, the campaign that succeeded Ahmadinejad was characterized 
by an almost palpable determination to repudiate him” (Maloney The 2013 Presidential 
Election: 686 Applicants, Only Eight Contenders). Rouhani took on this campaign and 
“boldly denounced [Ahmadinejad’s] recklessness and highlighted the costs to the economy” 
(Maloney A Lack of Trust on the Nuclear Issue). Rouhani has successfully managed to 
reintroduce Iran to the world as a more neutral power, by actions such as taking up contact 
with the U.S. 2015 was a notable year that illustrated Rouhani’s success, as a Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed to “address international concerns about 
Iran’s nuclear program” (Wuthnow 1). This event was welcomed by China and Chinese firms 
who immediately seized the opportunity to increase their investment in Iran. The official 
stamp on these increased positive relations between both countries came with Xi Jinping’s 
visit to Tehran on the 25th of January, 2016. The visit was held to sign a trade-deal to increase 
trade to $600 billion by 2026 along with China’s Silk Road project (Erdbrink). President Xi 
also highlighted the hope of expanding political relations between the two countries, including 
voicing its support for “Iran’s bid for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation 
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Organization”, expanding economic, and notably also expanding cultural relations between 
both countries so as to facilitate an increase in bilateral tourism (Wuthnow 3-4).  A 25-year 
strategic plan was also singed during the visit to further increase trade between both countries 
(AlWaght). 
Highlights of Xi Jinping’s visit: The Chinese president had the honour of meeting the 
Supreme leader of Iran during his recent visit. The language used by both parties to make 
references towards each other are indicative of the shared historical identity discussed 
previously in this thesis, as well as the material benefits. The Supreme leader referred to 
China as an “independent and reliable” country, and spoke in favour the 25 year strategic 
trade agreement (AlWaght). China being seen as an independent country illustrates that Iran’s 
current foreign policy outlook respects the nation, and does not see it being influenced by the 
U.S hegemon. The Chinese cooperation with Iran during the sanctions was also a point the 
Supreme leader regarded positively. President Xi Jinping shared equally positive comments 
on the bilateral relations, by bringing up the shared identity of Iran and China’s Silk Road 
history, stating that it was one of “peace, progress and friendly exchanges” (AlWaght). This 
meeting showed that Iran’s current foreign policy towards China was reflective of most of the 
historical points previously discussed, and that Iran is not hesitant to continue its economic 
exchanges with China. Both the shared identities and the material incentives were emphasized 
during the visit.  
CONCLUSION 
 Iran and China’s  ancient history, and revolutionary identities that are very different 
from each-other but similar in their anti-colonial sentiments, give both nations a basis for a 
mutual understanding of the challenges of finding one’s place in a Western dominated world 
order. However, there is more than identity component to Iran’s foreign relations with China. 
The positive foreign relations greatly rely on the economic incentives, such as the new 25 
year strategic trade partnership. In Wuthnow’s words, “China’s economic, political, and 
strategic interests are too complex and self-contradictory to permit a close alignment with Iran” 
(9). But Iran too faces internal contradictions that at times make it difficult to fully understand 
the thought process behind the nation’s foreign relations. In Maloney’s words, Iran “is at once 
an autocratic system, governed by the whims of a ruler who claims a divine mandate, and at 
the same time a fractious country shaped by a faction competition and the institutions and the 
institutions of the Islamic Republic are in its DNA” (Rouhani, the West and the Road Ahead). 
The revolutionary identity of Iran continues to play a much larger role in its foreign policy 
than that of China, as Ayatollah Khamenei tweeted: “…feeling in country is that top officials 
of System, despite differences in methods, share views in line with the main Revolution goals” 
(Khamenei.ir). However, China no longer aligns itself as strongly with its revolutionary 
ideology. “China has…shed much of its revolutionary ideology on foreign policy issues” 
(Harold and Nader 21). It is the two nations view on anti-U.S hegemony that provides them 
with common ground and both seek in some way to establish a different world order 
(Wuthnow 6). Both nations attempt to forge strongly independent images, a point influenced 
by their history as great civilizations, and later subjugation to western powers during  the 
period of colonialism. 
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 Iran and China “are sovereign countries with full and rightful authority to cooperate 
together as they see fit”, regardless of what the U.S and other nations think (Garver 284).  As 
the Supreme Leader declared during Xi Jinping’s recent visit, the west “have never been able 
to win the Iranian nation’s trust” in juxtaposition to the East (AlWaght). This East was in 
reference to a reliable China which has supported Iran through its sanction period, and 
continues to invest in the nation. Equally, this allows China to benefit from Iran’s large oil 
reserves.   
One of the consistencies in the post-revolutionary foreign policy in Iran is a 
“motivational drive towards challenging international realities”(Adib-Moghaddam 267). 
Iran’s foreign relations with China do exactly that. The two nations hold similar stances on 
Western interference in the region and in their internal politics, such as arms controls and 
what human rights are, that prevent third world countries from challenging the current world 
order (Van Kemenade 57).  These relations are the background to growing investments from 
China in the Iranian energy sector, and market. Iranian-Chinese foreign relations have 
evolved since 2006 mainly in the economic sphere, with a growth in material incentives. 
None the less, their shared historical identities and their position in the current ‘world order’ 
provide them with a mutual understanding of each other than goes beyond the strategic 
benefits of their relationship. Only time will tell whether their mutual cooperation will 
contribute to a shift in the world order, making it more multipolar by 2025 as the US CIA had 
predicted, transferring the “relative wealth and economic power from West to East” (Nau and 
Ollapaly 5). For now, Iran and China will continue to engage in trade, and in their respective 
manners challenge the Western-hegemony of world politics.   
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